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FOREWORD
Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S.
security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies
Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of
Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved
in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the
stabilization of relationships among the members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come
together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found
itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in
the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was
reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons.
This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why
Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in
1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the
very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author also examines the nature of
Russia's threat to Ukraine and the implications of the new
agreement for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ukraine and Russia.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study on nonproliferation and the security of Ukraine and hopes
that it will contribute to the ongoing discussion of these issues
of international importance.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
When the Soviet Union collapsed the new Ukrainian state
inherited the nuclear weapons that had been deployed on its
territory. Through 1993 there was growing support in Ukraine for
the establishment of a quid pro quo. Many Ukrainians felt that,
in return for denuclearization, Ukraine should receive security
and economic guarantees from both Washington and Moscow. Until
then it would hold back on dismantling and transferring the
weapons to Russia, signing the START treaties, and ratifying the
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in January 1994, after
considerable coaxing and pressure, Ukraine agreed with Russia and
the United States to proceed along those lines. This monograph
examines the reasoning behind that decision and the implications
of it for Ukraine's security and for its relationship with the
United States.
Ukraine's primary reasons for retaining the weapons were to
deter Russia and to obtain U.S. guarantees and attention.
However, because it never even began successful economic reform,
Ukraine's economic condition has sharply deteriorated--to the
degree that it now finds itself menaced by both economic collapse
and ethnic separatism by its Russian population, mainly in
Crimea. Despite its best efforts, Ukraine did not secure binding
American guarantees of security. Meanwhile, compensation for its
expenses is contingent upon ratification of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty which has yet to be consummated.
Ukraine's politics remain deadlocked as does its security
profile and it increasingly seems that Kiev believes America will
ease its demands for substantial economic reform in order to
protect it against the Russian threat. That threat is a real one
deriving its power from the omnipresent Russian denial that
Ukraine is or should be a sovereign state. Russia has employed
nuclear blackmail, economic warfare, political and diplomatic
campaigns, and incidents in the Black Sea to isolate Ukraine,
diminish its sovereignty, and induce, if not coerce, it back into
a military-political union with Russia in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Therefore, Moscow regarded the prospect
of Ukrainian nuclearization with unfeigned alarm. And precisely
for that reason Ukraine's weapons, like Russia's, were used
essentially as instruments of political bargaining and
deterrence.
However, with the conclusion of the tripartite accord in
January 1994, the United States has committed itself to
involvement in all aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian relationship
that are crucial to the security of the CIS and Europe. Perhaps
without realizing it, the United States has become a permanent
factor in the regional security equation. The United States is
seen by Kiev, whatever U.S. policy is in actuality, as being able
to guarantee Ukraine against Moscow's pressures. At the same
time, Ukraine's obdurate failure to reform its economy and its
deepening political gridlock at home mean that the greatest and

most immediate threats to it are ones that the United States can
do little about. While it was appropriate for the U.S. Government
to engage itself seriously with Ukraine, the task of ensuring
Ukraine's security is so immense and growing so much more
difficult due to Kiev's own misrule, that it may not be possible
for the United States to avoid entanglement in what could easily
be another Yugoslav type situation, albeit in countries with
nuclear systems on their soil.

PROLIFERATION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN UKRAINE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN AND U.S. SECURITY
Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union
collapsed. It did not develop them and had originally proclaimed
its intention to denuclearize. But during 1993 the Ukrainian
public and elite increasingly became strongly inclined to retain
control and ownership over these weapons, although Ukraine
formally agreed to accept the START I treaty, dismantle, and then
transfer control over the weapons to Russia. Yet, in January
1994, Ukrainian President Kravchuk signed a treaty with the
United States and Russia to dismantle these weapons and return
them to Russia in return for substantial economic and security
guarantees. Accordingly we must explain why Kravchuk initially
maneuvered to keep the weapons and why he ultimately gave them up
and apparently renounced the decidedly ambivalent, if not double,
game relating to retaining the weapons.
The sequence of moves leading to Ukrainian nuclearization
was as much political as military. Today nuclear weapons are
instruments of political bargaining as much as they are of
military threat and deterrence.1 This insight helps clarify
Ukraine's course of action. The substantial literature on motives
for proliferation also helps explain Ukraine's motives, e.g.
William Overholt's "checklist" for a state to go nuclear comports
well with Ukraine's.2 The decision to forego nuclear weapons can
also be explained. So too can we clarify the implications of this
whole cycle for Ukrainian security, proliferation and deterrence.
Undoubtedly this issue also has profound implications and
repercussions for European security and the future of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since the NPT comes up for
renewal and review in 1995, Ukraine's ultimate decision has
critical importance outside of Europe as well.
Ukraine's Objectives.
First we must understand Ukraine's purposes for keeping its
nuclear weapons and obtaining control over them. Ukraine's
recently adopted military doctrine stated its intention to be a
nonnuclear state. It also renounced any territorial claims
against anyone and claimed that Ukraine had no enemies. Indeed
the doctrine calls for nuclear free zones and regional security
in Eastern Europe. But any state "whose consistent policy
constitutes a military danger for Ukraine, leads to the
interference in internal matters, and encroaches on its
territorial integrity or national interests" is described as an
enemy.3 Obviously that means Russia. But despite disclaimers of
going nuclear, Ukraine, in practice, was visibly moving to gain
the weapons.4 While Ukraine's sense of threat is not unfounded,
it exploited its potential nuclear status to extort political and
economic guarantees as well as to deter Russia; thus confirming
that proliferators use their weapons as much for bargaining as
for deterrence or warfighting.

As compensation for removing the weapons Ukraine has
demanded from Russia and NATO (and especially the United States)
binding military, political, and economic guarantees.5 To defray
the immense costs of denuclearization during a most acute
economic crisis Ukrainian officials talked of financial
compensation from the United States in billions of dollars. While
precise figures are unavailable, they apparently were seeking
between $2-5 billion. They also sought financial compensation for
the highly enriched uranium (HEU) that Ukraine would forego by
dismantling, and which could bring desperately needed billions on
the world market. In addition, they sought guarantees that
Ukraine will remain free from any outside economic pressure. This
mainly refers to Russia's easy ability to strangle Ukraine's oil
supply by charging world prices for energy sent to Ukraine.
Hitherto that energy was shipped below cost, as a subsidy to
Kiev. Both states are acutely aware that Russia can bring
Ukraine's economy to a halt by exploiting this control over
Ukrainian energy supplies.6 By late 1993 Ukraine's energy debt
and Russian cutoffs became a major cause of its catastrophic
economic situation making Russia's potential threat all the more
frightening. Continued Russian oil and gas subsidies are a second
condition of denuclearization.
Lastly, Ukraine sought from the West, again mainly the
United States, a guarantee of political integrity and sovereignty
against any attack, conventional or nuclear, from Russia.7 Kiev
wanted this guarantee to go beyond those offered in the NPT,
where any attack by a nuclear state upon a nonnuclear one would
be taken to the U.N.8 Kiev demanded that the United States, and
presumably the Western Alliance, guarantee to take military
action against any state attacking it, i.e. Russia, and that
Russia guarantee its borders too. Nowhere was it stated what form
this Western guarantee should take. That is, should the United
States act alone or should it act with and through NATO? Should
the guarantee remain strictly limited to conventional
counterattacks or escalate to the nuclear level? Obviously these
questions involve the most profound issues of allied and European
security. But one of the most bedeviling aspects of this whole
episode is Ukraine's ultimate inability to fashion a coherent
security policy that could answer such questions. Indeed, Ukraine
arguably sought the nuclear option because it cannot either
afford economically or decide politically how to confront its
various military-political-economic challenges by purely
conventional military and political means. Nuclear weapons became
a kind of magic talisman to ward off many devils. And, as we
shall see Ukraine appeared to renounce nuclear weapons partly
because it told itself that the United States had in some
undefined way guaranteed Ukraine's borders and sovereignty and
promised large sums.
A crucial problem with Ukrainian policy is that diverse
spokesmen advocate different security guarantees that are or
could be incompatible let alone unrealistic. There have been

requests for a written document stipulating that any threat of
force against Ukraine by a nuclear state would be regarded as
unacceptable by other nuclear states. Or, as the nationalist Rukh
party's chairman Vyacheslav Chornovil stated, membership in NATO
would be post-nuclear Ukraine's sole guarantee. Ex-Prime Minister
Kuchma even asked for U.S. extended deterrence.9 Deputy Foreign
Minister Tarasiuk called for a written document possessing the
economic, territorial, and military guarantees listed above.10
But Ukrainian Deputy and defense expert Serhiy Holovatyy told a
conference in Germany devoted to the Partnership for Peace
Program that Ukraine opposed including any countries east of
Germany in NATO. He even rejected the offer to consult with the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council on threats to the states of
Central and Eastern Europe because those situations could lead to
Ukraine's separation from Western Europe and/or its neighbors in
Central Europe, and even to renewed dependence on Russia.11 He
charged that Ukraine's security is determined by "certain Russian
tendencies and political forces."12
While this is not necessarily official policy, it reflects
the paralysis in Ukrainian political thinking because it leaves
Ukraine with only one option: unilateral isolated opposition to
Russia, but now without nuclear weapons or potential allies. This
belief that Russian trends are, in the final instance, what
determines trends in Ukraine, or any other post-Soviet state is
common across the CIS. It also is one of the factors that makes
for uncertainty and even paralysis in those states' policy
because it concedes the initiative to Russia and throws the ball
to the West's court, while the state in question shrinks from the
hard job of devising and conducting a Russian policy.13
At the same time, leading Ukrainian officials like
presidential advisor Anton Buteyko claim that the U.S. signature
to the treaty makes it more likely that it will be respected.14
Or like Foreign Minister Zlenko, they claim they now have a
multilateral guarantee from the nuclear powers.15 Yet examination
of the accord's published portions and statements by U.S.
Ambassador to Kiev William Miller and Defense Secretary Perry
show that Kiev received much more tenuous guarantees than these
statements would lead one to believe. Ambassador Miller observed
that if any state either attacks Ukraine or makes territorial
claims upon it the United States will appeal to the U.N. or
similar international organizations as the NPT says.16 Similarly,
Secretary Perry publicly denied that the United States made any
guarantees to Ukraine.17 The text broadcast by Radio Ukraine
World Service on January 15, 1994 confirms that U.S. obligations
do not transcend those in the NPT.
Once Ukraine ratifies START I and signs the NPT, Russia and
the United States will confirm to Kiev their obligations under
the CSCE Final Act to respect the independence, sovereignty, and
integrity of CSCE member states. They will also recognize that
border changes may be carried out only through peaceful means and
by mutual agreement. They will similarly confirm their obligation

to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity and/or independence of any state.
Additionally both states confirm that their weapons will not be
used for other than defensive purposes, in accordance with the
U.N. charter. Both states also assure Ukraine of their
obligations under the CSCE Final Act to refrain from economic
pressure directed at subjecting Ukraine to their own interests
and advantage. Should a nuclear power attack Ukraine they "will
confirm their obligations to demand immediate action on the part
of the U.N. Security Council with the aim of giving assistance to
Ukraine as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that does not
possess nuclear weapons." If Ukraine becomes a victim of an act
of aggression or is threatened by an aggression involving nuclear
weapons, they "will confirm their obligations to Ukraine not to
use nuclear weapons against it or any other nonnuclear signatory
of the NPT unless they themselves, their allies, or their
territory is attacked by Ukraine or any state allied to it having
nuclear weapons."18
Though these conditions seem to guarantee Ukraine against
economic, territorial, and military-political threats, in reality
the CSCE and U.N. are of little avail against the combination of
economic pressure and support for Russian separatism involving
the Crimea or Eastern Ukraine that Russia could bring to bear. In
addition, the trend is away from extended U.S. nuclear deterrence
even as NATO's conventional forces are being decimated due to
budget cuts. This guarantee also does not break the Russian
military doctrine's threat to Ukraine in the event of adhesion to
NATO, indeed it confirms Russia could use nuclear weapons against
a Ukraine allied to NATO, even in a purely conventional war and
even if Ukraine was not an active belligerent. That clause alone
is intended to deter Ukraine from joining NATO in peacetime since
it would automatically become a target for Russia. This is
another instance of using nuclear weapons for political
bargaining. Nor do U.S. leaders see themselves as committed in
any way other than the NPT to protect Ukraine, though the
Ukrainian government thinks that is the case. Nor does Bosnia's
example comfort Ukraine, especially if, as seems to be the case,
it continues to shrink from carrying out the economic reforms
that it needs to survive. As Ambassador Miller and the treaty
text indicate, the guarantees to the Ukraine are no better than
those in the original NPT. Since Russia can block action in the
Security Council and the CSCE, while bringing other pressures to
bear, these guarantees remain somewhat hypothetical.
Sensing that, many members of the Rada have attacked the
treaty and some have even said that Ukraine should not adhere to
the NPT until it first receives financial compensation for
denuclearization.19 That action would negate the treaty since the
guarantees only come into effect after adherence to the NPT. But
the raising of this point, along with charges that the government
altered the text of the Rada resolution accepting START I to make
it look like the earlier Rada vote to accept START with
conditions that effectively gutted it was no longer valid since

the conditions had now been satisfied, indicates the depth of
internal political struggle between legislature and executive in
Ukraine.20 Given those conditions and internal threats to Ukraine
due to its mismanagement of reform and Russian unrest, it is
doubtful that the Ukraine can either stabilize itself on the
basis of this treaty, or put lasting credence in its guarantees.
In other words, this treaty notwithstanding, the challenges
facing all those interested in a strong and viable Ukraine are
only now emerging in their full and daunting scale and
complexity.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that Ukraine has now
committed itself to denuclearize before it has proven able to
devise an alternative security structure or program. That lack of
viable doctrine means that Ukraine cannot easily integrate into
the Partnership for Peace and dims the hope of future membership
in NATO or the EU. Rather it remains dependent on the vague
superpowers' guarantee. Rada member and Environment Minister Yuri
Kostenko argued that Ukraine should not denuclearize until it is
clear that any aggression against it would automatically threaten
the interests of many other European states. Holding missiles
until then lets Ukraine play a key role in every Pan-European
process and gradually exchange its deterrent for another system
of effective structures and guarantees.21
Any analysis of these conditions, even one acknowledging the
reality of the Russian threat, must nonetheless conclude that
Ukraine's conditions were not only unrealizable, they bordered on
the fantastic. This reinforces our working hypothesis that these
weapons are primarily instruments of political bargaining with
dubious operational utility, even under the limited conditions
where nuclear war might be warranted. Certainly there is no way
Ukraine can receive a U.S. commitment for nuclear strikes on an
attacker, even a strictly conventional one, when neither the
United States nor NATO will give similar guarantees to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Nor is it likely that any such
treaty clause could go through Congress unscathed. Ukraine cannot
be secured by the superpowers' mutual suicide and the destruction
of Western civilization. Nor can a rapidly demobilizing NATO
adequately defend Ukraine against either nuclear or conventional
attack though both scenarios are rather unlikely anytime soon
given the condition of the Russian army.
Nor would Kostenko's scenario inspire Europe to welcome
Ukraine; quite the opposite, since the weapons are targeted on
the NATO allies and Ukraine is widely suspected of seeking
positive control and retargeting capability over them. Certainly
nobody in Europe would then trust Kiev. Indeed, loose talk in
Ukrainian newspapers of a nuclear umbrella over Poland, Slovakia,
Czech Republic, and Hungary does not allay such fears.22
Furthermore, any new nuclearization in Europe instantly reopens
the nuclearization agenda that we have largely overcome. States
will then request to redeploy tactical or strategic U.S. systems
in Europe, create their own deterrents, and non-NATO states will

seek U.S. or Russian extended deterrence against Kiev.23 One
should be clear what this means today. As Stephen Cimbala points
out, extended deterrence means that one is ready to wage "small
wars" or threaten big ones to deter a nuclear power if need be.24
By the same token it seems equally unimaginable that Ukraine
can count on receiving billions from a Western world in the
throes of a recession whose dimensions are the greatest since
1948, and at the same time demand that it be immunized from the
need to reform its economy. The U.S. position had been that it
would commit some $330 million to Ukraine to denuclearize as
specified in the Nunn-Lugar act, provided reforms take place. But
the demand for immunization against economic pressure really
translated into a demand for immunity against reform. The
nomenklatura policies that have led Ukraine into hyperinflation
and depression continue as the government's policies resemble
those of the ill-starred Soviet Ryzhkov regime of 1988-91. The
Ukrainian parliament elected in March 1994 is so divided among
pro-Russians and Ukrainian nationalists on the one hand and
between reformers and conservatives on the other that gridlock is
to be expected there. In any case, until now the government has
shown neither interest in nor aptitude for making reforms. And
finally we are urging Russia to decontrol energy prices to bring
them to the world level for its own sake. We cannot then tell
Moscow to exempt Kiev from this demand. Thus Kiev's economic
conditions are as unrealistic as its political-military ones. In
the end the subsidies under this treaty will run out while
Ukraine must keep to very strict denuclearization schedules to
achieve them and immediately and comprehensively address its
economic and military security problems.
Though the financial terms of the treaty, including sale of
the HEU with the proceeds going to Ukraine, a year's debt
forgiveness by Russia of Ukrainian energy debts, and compensation
under Nunn-Lugar for the missiles do meet most if not all of
Ukraine's demands, they extend over several years. Without reform
the treaty's benefits will be squandered. Indeed Ukraine's prior
economic conditions showed an unrealism and desire to escape from
the real world of constant economic and political pressures into
some never-never-land where Ukraine will have no problems and no
need to take action since it will be guaranteed by foreign allies
and immunized against any outside economic pressure. This line
was, in fact, an abdication of responsibility and reality that
unfortunately is not uncommon in Eastern Europe. Essentially
Ukraine told the West that Russia per se is an ontological threat
and upon its future course depends Ukraine's whole policy, a
common regional perception.25 In addition, without nuclear
weapons Ukraine, on its own, cannot deal with the threat.
Moreover it cannot take steps to strengthen itself domestically
unless the West categorically defends its sovereignty, integrity,
and economic system and guarantees it against the foreign
economic pressure from policies that Russia must undertake for
its own interests while pouring in money to an unreformed
Ukraine. This demand, that the West rescue new states in this

region from having to deal with the genuine Russian threat, is
not restricted to Kiev. But Ukraine's outlook, added to its
political irresponsibility with nuclear weapons and internal
political polarizations, is particularly unsettling.
Even more unsettling is a decision to maintain Chernobyl and
other atomic energy stations as main power sources. That policy
could lead to a second Chernobyl catastrophe at a time when
Ukraine's ability to manage its weapons and presumably such
stations is doubted in the West, Russia, and even in Ukraine
itself. Equally, if not more, disquieting is the fact that
analysts of Ukraine concede that there is little understanding in
Kiev of the complexities of deterrence, second strike capability,
and the necessary C3 architecture for nuclear systems.26 Ukraine
is literally playing with fire.
The sentiment for continued nuclearization and positive
control over the weapons is not only directed to deter Russia. It
is widely believed that without these weapons the United States
and Europe would not take Ukraine seriously at all and, second,
that these weapons give Ukraine a reassuring sense of its
importance. As Overholt suggests, prestige plays a big role as a
motivator here, i.e., the nuclear weapons have an equally
important psychological function for Ukraine.27 Admittedly the
Bush administration probably did not take the ex-republics of the
old USSR seriously enough or devote sufficient attention to
Ukraine. But the Clinton administration has sought every avenue
of negotiation with Ukraine and sent Secretary of State
Christopher, Secretary of Defense Aspin, and then Ambassador
Talbott to Kiev. Even President Clinton personally called
President Kravchuk to warn him against keeping nuclear weapons
and only a conditional acceptance of the Lisbon Protocol.
Ukraine's unwillingness to give up the weapons as pledged before
1994 had created the suspicion that we are being held up or
blackmailed. That feeling could easily have poisoned Ukraine's
relationship with the United States rather than help it.28
Paradoxically, the political bargain Ukraine seeks could easily
have been undone precisely by its recalcitrance on the nuclear
issue. With this background in mind we can proceed further to
employ Overholt's categories to explain Ukraine's motives. In the
case of the Russian threat to Ukraine we are dealing with a real
and deeply felt political-military phenomenon and perception.
The Russian Threat to Ukraine.
Enough has been written on Russo-Ukrainian relations to
underscore the gravity of the Russian threat. From the inception
of the CIS, Russian leaders arrogated to Russia the leading role
and they formed the CIS to retain as much as possible of a
political union.29 The CIS also was intended to preserve, as much
as possible, a military union inherited from the Soviet armed
forces and carry this unified military into the future under a
new political leadership.30 Since then Russian policy has ever

more overtly substituted itself for the CIS and reserves to
itself the right to a Pax Russica or Monroe Doctrine throughout
the former Soviet Union.31
Ukraine's refusal to play along, its formation of its own
army, claims to the Black Sea Fleet and to nuclear weapons were
thus major obstacles to the project to de-Sovietize the USSR but
preserve a military-political union. There are also important
figures who believe that the neighboring CIS and Baltic states
can only be satellites of Russia or of NATO, a mode of thought
derived from Lenin and Stalin, and that Ukraine objectively bars
Russia from Eastern Europe. Indeed, one analyst openly proclaims
the main task of Russian foreign policy in the future to be the
creation of conditions for a "qualitative" change in the
composition of Ukraine's ruling elite to include those who wish
to cooperate with Russia before Ukraine's national identity is
firmly consolidated.32 When one adds to this resentment and
frustration Russians' deep-rooted belief that a Ukrainian state
is something between a bad joke and the blackest treachery, the
reasons for mutual suspicion grow.33
During 1992-93, it became clear that Russia's Parliament
sought to detach Crimea from Ukraine and annex it to Russia and
that a growing nationalist movement inside Crimea sought the same
objective. Russia's ambassador to Ukraine stated that if enough
Russian speakers (i.e., not just ethnic Russians) wanted to join
Russia, Russia would act to support them.34 So added to the
political doubts about Ukraine as a real state were fears of a
territorial fifth column and attempt to revise the borders.
Indeed, careful examination of Russian security policy
throughout the former USSR shows Russia increasingly combining or
orchestrating all the economic, political, and military levers it
possesses to have its way. In the local wars and crises on its
periphery it has not hesitated to use or threaten direct military
force to dismember insufficiently pro-Russian states as in
Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, the Baltic states and Ukraine or to play
the card of the Russian diaspora or of traditionally pro-Russian
local minorities (as in Georgia).35 In November 1993,
Vice-Premier Shokhin asserted that the status of Russian
minorities throughout the CIS would be present in "all economic
talks with CIS countries," including Ukraine. He further
elaborated that,
Moreover we shall negotiate the extension of credits
solely with those states, which will first conclude
with Russia agreements on migration with rigid
obligations, including that on material compensation
for migrants, and second, conclude an agreement on dual
citizenship . . . We tie politics with economics . . .
the same is true of the condition of the Russian
speaking people (i.e., not just ethnic Russians-SJB) in
the `near abroad.' Whenever some benefits are requested
from us, we are entitled to pose a question about the

balance of interests . . . I believe that with time we
will all become accustomed to the thought that this
does not amount to some imperial ambitions, but a
normal negotiating process.36
These remarks expressed the policy of the reform government
that fell in December 1993 to a still more aggressively
imperialist-minded coalition. The recent defeat of the Russian
reformers, who were less truculent on the territorial issue, and
the switch to the right in Russia only alarmed Ukraine even more.
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev has called Ukraine a mythical
state. Russian diplomats have argued abroad that Ukraine will not
be a state for long, attempted to isolate Ukraine from Poland in
particular, and frustrated its policy of creating a Baltic-Black
Sea bloc in Eastern Europe.37 They also have worked to prevent
Ukraine from joining any Western security system that Russia is
not a part of. Russia thus seeks a veto over Ukraine's freely
chosen entry into NATO or the European Union.38
Although Russia previously guaranteed Ukraine's borders, it
did so only in the context of the CIS, not bilaterally, adding to
Ukraine's fears. It also has been claimed in the West that the
only Ukraine Moscow would accept outside of the CIS would be
denuclearized; stripped of Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and the Black
Sea Fleet; and economically impoverished.39 Indeed, a uniform
Russian pattern of territorial and ethnic threats, and a restored
economic union based on highly exploitative relationships with
the periphery where Moscow controls energy sources and further
progress in reforms seems to characterize overall Russian
policy.40 Unfortunately Ukraine's failure to reform makes it all
too easy for Moscow to flash those trumps despite the treaty.
The most visible threat appears in Russia's overall security
doctrine of May 1993 and defense doctrine of November 1993.
Russian policy since 1993 clearly conforms to the objectives set
forth in these documents. The consistency with which these
policies have been pursued also strongly suggests a durable
consensus throughout the government on foreign and defense
policies.41 The security document asserts that Russia alone
guarantees the security of the whole CIS.42 It implies a Brezhnev
doctrine type approach to the security of those states and also a
basis for a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine. Since then
Russia has argued for revising the CFE treaty to put more troops
on its southern frontier, ostensibly for defense against ethnic
wars in the Caucasus. But these forces could easily threaten
Ukraine as well. It is also noteworthy that Ukraine too supports
such revisions in order to redeploy its troops towards Russia.
Russian officials also have campaigned for Western recognition of
the right to station Russian troops abroad in so-called hot spots
and enjoy a visibly hegemonical role in its neighborhood as
guarantors of their neighbors' security. In addition, they often
act as or speak as if the West has assented to such a role,
something open to some doubt.43

Of growing and particular significance are the sections in
the 1992 draft and the 1993 doctrine that spell out Russia's
self-proclaimed role of protector of Russian minorities abroad.
From both documents it is clear that Russia's armed forces and
government regard threats to their civil rights, real or
imagined, as potential causes for military action.44 Lately
Russian leaders have pledged they would conduct a "tough" policy
to defend those minorities' rights. At the CIS Ashgabat
conference in December 1993, Russia unsuccessfully strove for
special rights and agencies for Russians' dual citizenship
abroad.45
The danger facing a Ukraine with 11 million Russians is that
any exacerbation of the fragile interethnic truce there could
cause an armed conflict. The most crucial current point is the
Crimea where on January 30, 1994, President Meshkov was
overwhelmingly elected on a platform to return Crimea to
military-political-economic union with Russia. Ukrainian
nationalists like Chornovil urged Kiev to annul those election
returns, an extremely provocative move.46 Since then the conflict
has only deepened in intensity as Crimea overtly strives for
independence. If the Crimean situation cannot be resolved
internally by peaceful political means, it could offer Russia an
opportunity to validate the implicit threats in its doctrine and
policy. Given Russia's present right-wing drift, its government
would be hard-pressed not to support the Russians in Crimea if
they seek union with Russia under the right to selfdetermination. After all, its ambassador is already on record
saying that Moscow would so act.47
The Crimean issue alone could become the most explosive one
inside Ukraine because here the ethnic consequences of Kiev's
gross economic mismanagement can make themselves most violently
felt. There have already been attacks on nationalist Russians
including newly-elected president Meshkov. Likewise, any effort
at Russian self-assertion there could well lead the indigenous
Crimean Tatar population into a much more intense, even violent,
affirmation of its historic rights (and by those terms they are
Crimea's rightful heirs) against Moscow and/or Kiev.48
At the same time the impact of possible trouble in Crimea
cuts both ways on the new treaty. Some, seeing Russia's threat to
Ukraine's integrity, feel still more inclined to keep the nuclear
weapons to deter any move by Russia or Russians in Crimea (and
elsewhere in Ukraine) to organize for self-determination. This
stance risks using the weapons as a political and military
deterrent against a self-determination movement, an incongruity
that is no less dangerous because such conflicts have a nasty
habit of becoming protracted all-or-nothing affairs. An equally
dangerous factor lies in the asymmetry of responses available to
Ukraine which shows no interest in or knowledge of what to do to
alleviate the socio-economic distress that provokes ethnic
self-assertion. Lacking any viable or coherent reform policy
other than a shrill effort to hold onto nuclear assets it does

not control, Ukraine, confronting a nationalist movement under
such circumstances, would have little means of devising an
effective response to it. On the other hand, supporters of the
treaty see the Russo-U.S. guarantees of Ukraine's integrity and
sovereignty as barriers to Russian support for a Crimean
self-determination movement, and therefore support the treaty
even though a literal reading of it in no way precludes the
Crimeans from rising or Russia from bringing pressure on Ukraine
to let them go.49
Russia's 1993 defense doctrine, like its earlier very
conservative draft of 1992, also makes explicit threats to
Ukraine. Though it claims to guarantee Ukraine (and all other
members of the CIS) it does so within the context of the CIS, not
in Ukraine's own right. This clumsy effort to satisfy Kiev's
demands for a guarantee was counterproductive. Ukraine will
resist any effort to guarantee Ukraine only in the CIS context. A
firm bilateral, or trilateral, guarantee that includes Washington
and Moscow, like the new treaty, is its aim. The defense doctrine
seems to offer a concession to Ukraine in that it renounces the
use of nuclear weapons against any signatories of the NPT as in
the original treaty of 1968. This should, it was argued, provide
the guarantee Ukraine seeks. However, that guarantee was made in
1968 and Russia is already on record as adhering to this Soviet
treaty, so its statement is nothing new. Moreover, Russia's
defense doctrine clearly states that Russia will use nuclear
weapons first against any attack, conventional or nuclear, by a
power owning nuclear weapons or allied to nuclear states.50
This provision not only threatens Ukraine even if it acts
only conventionally, it also is a naked attempt to use nuclear
weapons to gain a veto over Ukraine's security policy and
preserve its isolation in Europe by obstructing Ukraine's entry
into NATO or any other bloc. We see here the use of nuclear
weapons as political bargaining chips and Russia's continuing
effort to diminish the sovereignty of its European neighbors.
Since Russia must resort to nuclear threats in lieu of a robust
conventional army, Ukraine lives under the threat of a power that
does not accept its sovereignty or integrity and tries to extend
deterrence to it against its will even as it threatens Ukraine
with a nuclear first-strike. These threats are compelling reasons
for Ukraine to go nuclear.
As Overholt suggests, public demand for nuclear weapons,
either expressed directly in polls or other forms of direct
expression, or through legislative representatives, could be a
factor for proliferation. Ukraine presents an interesting case
that corroborates his findings. If one looks at Ukraine's
political map one finds that the Russians are concentrated to the
East and South while Ukrainian nationalism is strongest in the
West and North. Throughout this century in Ukraine ethnic and
geographical stratification march hand-in-hand. As Ukraine's
economic condition reaches levels of epic catastrophe, it is
quite possible that it could come under mounting ethnic pressure

as well. Already a U.S. national intelligence estimate speculated
that, in 2 years, fragmentation of Ukraine into clashing ethnic
rivals is likely.51 The author's personal estimate is that the
wolf is already at the door and unless drastic action is taken
the crisis will be much sooner than that. However, any such
drastic action will probably rebound against the industrial
Russian sector and exacerbate the hitherto latent ethnic
tensions.
Second, the continuing tension between Moscow and Kiev on a
host of military and political issues like nuclear weapons has
already led to a vociferous Ukrainian nationalism and growing
support for an independent Ukrainian nuclear arsenal, complete
with sophisticated military rationales for it.52 These rationales
and support have clearly influenced the Rada which has forced
Kravchuk to play a delaying and not altogether scrupulous game
with it, Moscow, and Washington, regarding passage of the START I
treaty. When the Rada passed that treaty in November 1993, it
added so many conditions that the treaty was essentially negated.
This action touched off a hail of attacks from NATO and Moscow,
but it also showed the strength of public and elite support for
nuclear weapons until and unless the security guarantees,
financial considerations, and psychological recognition that the
weapons' advocates demand are received. This nationalist clamor
for security and for overt use of nuclear weapons as bargaining
chips narrows the space within which Kravchuk would like to
operate vis-a-vis Moscow and the Rada. This public and political
support for nuclear weapons corresponds to Overholt's categories
of public demands for leaders to do something in response to
tension or to a crisis as well as for international and national
prestige. But it also partakes of his factor of national morale
building inasmuch as it conveys the image of a Ukraine ready to
stand up to Moscow and Washington for its rights.53
Overholt also lists pressure from the military-industrial
complex as a motive. There are charges in the Ukrainian press
that this is indeed the case and that military industries want
nuclearization because it means more contracts for them and a
diminished risk of loss of workers, jobs, and funding.54 This
possibility is distinctly plausible, but cannot be ascertained at
a distance without direct confirmation. But what can be certified
is that, notwithstanding the Chernobyl disaster, Ukraine, due to
its lack of energy sources, has found it necessary to opt for an
extensive and equally dangerous nuclear energy industry. Kiev
knows that to consolidate its sovereignty and independence it
must create its own energy base.55 Non-Russian foreign suppliers,
though important, cannot suffice. Therefore, advocates for the
nuclear power industry also argue for an ongoing weapons
industry. Whether or not this a rational ecological and military
strategy (and it is seriously open to doubt given the quality of
local reactors); it quite clearly shows the military-industrial
complex's role in nuclear military programs and "rationally"
responds to the threat of economic dependency upon Russia.

Ukraine's Motives for Signing the Treaty.
Yet finally in January 1994 Ukraine agreed with Moscow and
Washington to dismantle its weapons, embark upon a complex
process of denuclearization for which it will receive substantial
American compensation, and rely on Russian guarantees. Therefore
we must assess why Kiev decided to renounce nuclear weapons.
There are few examples of states who renounced nuclear weapons to
choose from, but Ukraine's decision to sign the treaty is not
without foreign precedents. South Africa also renounced its
program and submitted to the IAEA and the NPT for two fundamental
reasons. First, the threat its leaders had perceived of a Soviet
backed invasion combined with internal ethnic or racial unrest
disappeared after settlement of the Namibia and Angola issues in
1988. Second, it recognized that suspicion of its nuclear
ambitions due to its refusal to sign the NPT caused distrust of
its policies and sincerity in reforms throughout Africa and the
world.56 Arguably South Africa's prior motives for going nuclear
also resemble Ukraine's, namely the desire to frighten the United
States into some sort of security guarantee to deter South Africa
from going nuclear against internal or foreign enemies.57
Similarly Ukraine's strategic situation is not unlike Pakistan's,
another proliferator. As Brahma Chellaney and Stephen Cohen
observed, "Pakistan, for example, belongs to that class of
nations whose survival is debated, whose legitimacy is doubted,
and whose conventional security apparatus may be inadequate to
cope with the pressures of hostile neighbors."58 Both South
Africa and Pakistan (and Israel) have claimed to face not just
"total onslaughts" or superior conventional enemies (and nuclear
foes--India, China) but also internal racial or ethnic enemies.
Thus their situation can easily be conceived to resemble
Ukraine's. There clearly does exist a commonality (along with
Israel) of using the nuclear weapons to deter superior or
potentially superior conventional enemy forces.
By the same token the military argument that nuclear weapons
would deter a conventionally and even nuclearly superior Russia
also goes back to both Swedish and French arguments of a
generation ago. Ukraine's potential arguments for using nuclear
weapons to dissuade internal conflict supported from outside
apparently derive from the French general and strategist, Andre
Beaufre, whose influential Introduction to Strategy evidently
also influenced South Africa.59 Similarly the decision to give up
the nuclear option may also be predicated on the awareness that
ethnic conflicts cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons because
the asymmetry of actual threat and deterrent are too great and
the bomb ultimately would destroy what Ukraine is fighting to
retain. Even nuclear states like China are apparently switching
their IRBM's to a conventional role to make them more effective
in limited (conventional) local wars.60 The case for conventional
deterrence, if any, in ethnic wars that are not conventional
theater wars, is still more compelling.

Sweden's case is also instructive. After 1952, Swedish
generals argued for a nuclear deterrent against a superior
Russian force. Generals argued that a small non-NATO and
nonnuclear state would be vulnerable to conventional attacks. Nor
did they believe that nonproliferation would induce the enemy's
restraint, either conventional or nuclear. Rather a nuclear
Sweden would deter such a force. Furthermore nuclear weapons were
cost effective and yielded considerable collateral tactical and
operational benefits in a conventional scenario, i.e., forcing
dispersion of enemy forces.61 It sufficed for Sweden, they
argued, to obtain a sufficient arsenal of tactical nuclear
weapons which would deter attacks while convincing everyone of
Sweden's nonoffensive aims since it had foregone strategic
weapons.62 This request triggered an emotional and protracted
debate in Sweden. In 1959 Prime Minister Tage Erlander presented
the Atomic Weapons' Committee report and stated,
In general an increase in defense strength within
certain limits means increased security, since the
price of victory for an aggressor is raised. But
security does not necessarily increase in some direct
relationship to military forces . . . Swedish foreign
and defense policies can be said to be built on the
assumption than an increase in military forces does not
lead to greater security if it is carried out with such
means that the risks of war are increased at the same
time.63
This report did not stop the debate which went on at least
until 1968 when the Parliamentary Commission on Defense reported
against nuclear weapons and determined that Sweden did not need
them since it was "existentially" under the nuclear umbrella of
the great powers though it was outside of any alliance system.
Even without any formal guarantees it participated in and
directly benefitted from the superpowers' extended deterrence.
The Commission reported,
The Party considering an attack on Sweden with or
without the use of nuclear weapons must in this case
also expect that nuclear weapons may be used against
his operations even though Sweden does not have such
weapons . . . The conclusion is that Sweden by and
large is under the nuclear umbrella approximately in
the same way that countries in our vicinity are,
regardless of which great power bloc or sphere of
interest they belong to.64
The reasons for Ukraine's signing the treaty go beyond this
although they are comparable. The threat from Russia has not
disappeared and could not even if no nuclear weapons existed. In
the logic of things, small nations next to big ones with a
tradition of empire are existentially nervous about their safety.
But it obviously became clear to Ukraine that a nuclear system
based on the existing weapons, if anything, reduced its security.

NATO ministers said it was unthinkable that a nuclear Ukraine
could join NATO and obtain the guarantees accruing thereby. Nor
would NATO members, including Washington, guarantee nuclear
action or financial assistance to defend a nuclear Ukraine whose
missiles were targeted against it.65 Paradoxically, possession of
nuclear weapons reduced effective extended deterrence since no
assured second strike or conventional riposte would be
forthcoming from abroad.
In addition, it became clear to Kravchuk that Ukraine could
not hope to manage its weapons, or to gain control of them, that
its economy was in ruins, and that it depended on Russia for
energy. Furthermore, as he told the Rada on February 2-3, 1994,
the weapons, being under Russian control, offered Russia another
pretext for intervention. Any effort by Ukraine to operationalize
control over them spelled Ukraine's doom.66 When Rada members
combined those factors with the threat of intervention through a
Crimean scenario and balanced it against the guarantees of both
Moscow and Washington in this agreement, the latter looked like a
better deal to safeguard Ukrainian integrity. They too realized
that atom bombs were of little use versus the Crimea.67
Probably many also realized that any effort to achieve
positive operational control of these systems, which was widely
believed to be Kiev's policy, would only trigger instant
retaliation by Moscow which nobody would effectively contest
because Ukraine's nuclear program had isolated it abroad. Equally
important is the fact that without an adequate command and
control system or second strike capability, had Ukraine moved to
gain control or gained control over the weapons, it would have
created the ideal first-strike target for a Russia committed to
just such an action by its defense doctrine.68 And by offering
its C2 system as prime target it also increased the chances that
this preemptive strike would quickly descend into a total war.69
Another unspoken factor may be related to Ukraine's deficiencies
in command and control. Soon after the treaty was signed, members
of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) of Ukraine who were guarding
the weapons at Uzin indicated their desire to return to Russian
service in the SRF. Since these men had only recently given
loyalty oaths to Ukraine, it is clear that their loyalty to Kiev
was much shakier then these oaths might have indicated. Since the
signing of the treaty Ukraine has been busily making these troops
reaffirm their loyalty oaths to Ukraine. While Russian media
charges that this means Ukraine seeks to evade the treaty and its
military is procrastinating, it also could denote Kiev's effort
to extract every last ounce of guarantees from Russia before it
relinquishes the weapons and signs the NPT.70
Because states with defective controls over nuclear systems
tend to have volatile civil-military relations in the first
place, as does Ukraine where nationalism in the armed forces is a
bitterly contested issue, reliance on ethnic Russians to control
these weapons may well have been a recipe for disaster.
Furthermore, assuming the Ukrainian leadership sensed this

dilemma they may have been aware that any effort on their part to
gain positive controls over the weapons instantly could have
precipitated the very intervention they feared, but it might have
come from within their own armed forces. Or even if they had
managed to weather that kind of crisis, they would know they
faced a permanent threat of a preventive strike, and relied upon
hair trigger C2 systems like launch on warning, especially if
they had no second strike capability. These considerations
highlight the importance of C2 features and structures among the
new nuclear states.71
Another important factor leading the Rada to reverse itself
and accept START I on February 3 was that the United States and
Russia had moved to satisfy many of Ukraine's economic concerns
about the disposition and dismantling of the weapons and their
components. If it failed to sign this accord Ukraine would lose
the sizable economic and political benefits that flowed from
Washington's serious effort to engage Kiev and its concerns.
Presumably the U.S. guarantee of Ukraine, and of Russia's
affirmation of Ukraine's integrity in this context may have also
led many to believe that Ukraine's security was thereby
strengthened. Perhaps Ukraine, like Sweden, concluded that
nuclearization derogated from security by heightening the risks
of war rather than deterring aggression, and that even without
formal guarantees Ukraine was existentially under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella due to this treaty. Or in other words, Ukraine
had reached the limit of using the weapons as a bargaining chip
and it was time to cash in. However, as stated above, it is by no
means certain that Kiev calculated correctly about Washington, or
that it matters in the end, given the crises it faces, unlike
Sweden's stability.
The 1994 treaty itself and adhesion to the NPT will be voted
on by the current Parliament that was elected in March 1994.
Already there is some outcry from nationalists who believe that
once again Kravchuk has sold out Ukraine to Russia or is seeking
his own power over the Rada.72 Kravchuk evidently feared that the
former Rada would not vote for the treaty and the NPT, although
they did ratify the Lisbon protocol and START I. He therefore
delayed proposing the treaty until after the elections.73 But
given the rivalry between the executive and the Rada that is
rooted in Ukraine's politics, even a vote for the treaty and the
flowing of its benefits to Kiev may not prevent a crisis from
tearing Ukraine apart because the economic crisis is the prime
accelerator of nationalist unrest and politicization. In other
words, this treaty may close the door only on one chapter of
Russo-Ukrainian relations in the new Europe and abolish the
specter of a nuclear Ukraine. But the task of ensuring a stable
sovereign Ukraine within its current borders is a long-term one
that is not over. Those would take on this task face profoundly
difficult challenges that can only be resolved over many years.
Moreover this challenge has recently become even more complex
with Kravchuk's announcement that he will not run for President
in the June 1994 elections. In other words, the Rada elections in

March did not resolve Ukraine's politics and, as is clear from
current developments, Ukraine is continuing to do exactly what is
contraindicated to successfully exit from its economic crisis.74
The Repercussions.
The entire chapter of proliferation and nonproliferation in
Ukraine has numerous repercussions, first, for Ukraine and its
role in European and the CIS' security; second, for issues of
proliferation; and, third, for the issues relating to deterrence
and the use of nuclear weapons for political bargaining.
Notwithstanding U.S. claims to the contrary and the secret nature
of some of the agreement's clauses, it seems clear that
Washington has incurred or is now seen to have incurred a moral,
if not concrete political-military obligation to Kiev.
Undoubtedly Ukrainian leaders so believe and Russian journalists,
like Vitaly Portnikov, also have pointed out that the accord
equalizes the U.S.' and Russia's role as guarantors of regional
security.75 Any discussion must be conjectural; but if an
obligation or the perception of one exists, it raises the most
serious questions about U.S. policy in Europe.
The United States has just refused to make such guarantees
with regard to all the former Soviet bloc states and instead
demanded a Partnership for Peace program that carries no
guarantees whatsoever and includes both Russia and Ukraine as
Moscow demanded. All we are pledged to do is consult in the event
of a crisis. Meanwhile Central Europe looks at the Western
paralysis and discord over Bosnia and cannot take even that
guarantee too seriously. The logic of this treaty would appear to
be at odds with the spirit of disengagement from Central European
security issues that seems to dominate our policy and that of our
allies because Washington seemingly has formally guaranteed
Ukraine's integrity, sovereignty, and independence and Russia's
affirmation of those principles. Thus it is committed to
involvement in the regional security agenda to a much greater
degree than before. And because of the immense importance of
Ukraine for Russia's destiny and security, the pursuit of a
stable bilateral relationship between Kiev and Moscow is a vital
U.S. interest. This is why Secretary Christopher reaffirmed our
support for Ukrainian integrity when the Crimean government
almost triggered another crisis in the spring of 1994.
However, there has been little public debate or awareness
over what we might do or not do should a crisis break out in
Ukraine, e.g., a Crimean secession movement. For example, the
Crimean government called for a referendum on the region's future
on March 27, 1994. Ukrainian officials annulled the referendum
which was expected to be overwhelmingly in favor of unity with
Russia. But Crimea has carried on its efforts to break free of
Ukraine. In the current climate of tough pro-diaspora Russians'
policies it is very difficult for Moscow to refrain from
intervening. At the same time Tarasiuk made it clear that Russian

intervention in the Crimea will cause Ukraine to stop
denuclearizing.76
Are we then obliged to resist that movement which will
likely claim the right to self-determination and provoke a
tremendous struggle with and within Russia? One cannot say that
this accord guarantees Ukraine against a self-determination
movement from within its own territory. We and Kiev thereby would
face a situation where an agreement guarantees Ukraine against a
contingency which is most unlikely to occur while the real threat
to Ukraine is not covered and is unanswerable from the United
States. Alternatively are we prepared to draw the European line
at the German border and consign Ukraine (and thus Poland) not
only to Russian extended deterrence but also to inclusion in a
Russian security zone? That policy would seem to nullify any
security guarantees given to Ukraine, but what practical remedies
are available to Washington in the event of a Ukrainian crisis?
Ominously there has been little public discussion about these
issues. After all, Russia has made clear its strong opposition to
any system that includes Ukraine but not it. There are even
Western analysts who argue that should Ukraine formally move to
any real system other than the CIS, that this will lead Moscow to
renew its claims on Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.77
Nor have we drawn the moral for Kazakhstan, which in
February 1994 likewise signed the NPT and renounced possession of
the nuclear weapons it inherited in return for economic
compensation and presumably political guarantees beyond the NPT
treaty.78 Kazakhstan too had played an ambivalent game in
holding out for U.S. guarantees and compensation. There were
plenty of Kazakh or other analysts, who, like their Ukrainian
counterparts, argued for holding out to the last moment to deter
threats from Russia or China and gain these compensations and
assurances.79 As ethnic tension starts to build there, a Crimean
type scenario could develop and Russia will not walk away from
its compatriots or Northern Kazakhstan without a fight. But what
then will happen should Almaty try to invoke the NPT or any other
accords, like the CSCE Final Act which it has signed? After all,
one could argue that the CSCE's Final Act's clauses on the
territorial integrity of the signatories has been irrevocably
shattered by the decision to dismember Yugoslavia into several
states in 1991-92. If that treaty or Final Act is effectively
null and void (as would seem to be the case) or is superseded by
the right of oppressed peoples to self-determination, Ukraine
then is vulnerable, even without Russian pressure, to a Crimean
or Northern Kazakhstani secessionist movement, and the conditions
under which its integrity is guaranteed in the January 1994
treaty are also essentially nullified.
Numerous analysts, like Edward Luttwak, point out the
decreasing efficacy and value of nuclear weapons for warfare in
general and of U.S. nuclear guarantees in particular.80 This
school links proliferation to the existence of an ally who can
extend deterrence, conventional or nuclear, to the would-be

proliferator. In today's multipolar world the old bipolar
alliance system that constrained proliferation is, they contend,
breaking down; consequently threatened states like Ukraine will
find it increasingly tempting to go nuclear.81 Or they will seek
to find their own defense to regional nuclear threats due to
uncertainty concerning U.S. policy, a process that appears to be
gathering steam in Japan because of North Korea's
proliferation.82 In addition, the temptation, based on the
precedents set by Pakistan, South Africa, and now Ukraine, to use
nuclear weapons to deter or threaten internal insurgencies that
would then receive foreign support could multiply, tying
proliferation to the internal instability of governments and
making nuclear systems hostage to Yugoslavian or Lebanese type
wars.
Turning to Europe we must remember that should Ukraine fall
apart the repercussions will spread all over Europe and intensify
growing pressures in multinational polities for fragmentation and
for further obstacles on the road to Central European, Eastern
European, and general European integration. Or will Ukraine
continue to claim neutrality even as it seeks to organize some
sort of alternative security system in Central and Eastern Europe
between a NATO that resists those states and a Russia all too
eager to integrate them? We must remember that many Ukrainian
figures advocated and attempted to devise a security system from
the Baltic to the Black Sea or an alternative system involving
Ukraine's neighbors, especially Poland and Hungary, only to see
these efforts fail due to Russian opposition, Ukraine's
neighbors' wariness of involvement in Kiev's quarrels with
Moscow, and the lure of NATO.83 Or can Ukraine even remain
neutral in the face of Russian opposition and Western apathy?
Nor can we consider Ukraine in isolation. It is the crucial
variable as to whether Russia regains an empire or remains just a
very important large state. On Ukraine's future hinges the
security of the whole CIS and the future of Russian democracy
because empire and democracy in Russia (if not elsewhere) are
antithetical. But what occurs if Ukraine continues to degenerate
or merely stagnates? Could Russia refrain from intervening in so
explosive and disintegrating situation on its border? After all
we must remember that today, despite its own difficulties, Russia
faces a situation that has traditionally been auspicious for its
imperial prospects: strife-torn, ethnically polarized, and barely
viable polities on its borders.
Russian elites, even liberals, often define Ukraine as an
objective impediment to Russia's interests. The Institute for the
USA and Canada (ISKAN) recently charged that Ukraine blocks
Russia's road to Southeast Europe.84 Or else Russian elites see
its nuclear policy as purely a cunning drive to nuclearization
with no fault of Russia's.85 Apart from this they see any
nuclearization of the post-Soviet states as threatening them with
nuclear encirclement within the CIS or from without, given
Iranian and Chinese missile developments.86 Undoubtedly a nuclear

Ukraine would also necessarily lead Russia to crash programs of
missile defense, probably going beyond mere theater missile
defense (TMD), to encompass an entire system of air and space
defense married to ground based installations. That would
seriously strain, if not overturn the ABM provisions of the SALT
I treaty and threaten overall strategic stability with the United
States while ruining Russia's economy. Anti-SDI advocates on both
sides of the cold war have repeatedly observed that any viable
ABM system threatens the other side with a preemptive first
strike since it could only respond with a second strike that the
defenses could then counter.87 Since Russia has indicated that if
Ukraine goes nuclear it no longer abides by START I and II, in
that case we would also return to a situation of intense vertical
proliferation of thousands of warheads (including MIRVs) along
with at least one side racing desperately to create a ABM system.
A general strategic destabilization would occur along with
intensified mutual pressures for preemptive first-strike
capability vis-a-vis Kiev and Moscow.
Thus Russia has compelling and vital interests at stake in
Ukraine's denuclearization. At the same time, it obviously also
seeks to constrain Ukraine's autonomy in security policy and
retain a nuclear monopoly in Central and Eastern Europe lest it
find itself in a rivalry with a nuclear Ukraine for regional
hegemony there. That is not an idle or purely speculative
consideration. Some Ukrainians have already speculated in public
on creating a Ukrainian centered system there apart from NATO or
Russia, and on the virtues of a Ukrainian nuclear umbrella in
Eastern Europe.88 Thus we must devise solutions that preserve
global and European strategic stability, deter Russian aggression
against Ukraine, and safeguard regional balance and stability.
Similarly Ukraine's destiny is critical to Poland. A robust
and healthy Ukraine is crucial to keeping a Russian threat away
from Poland and Central Europe. But until now neither Poland nor
Ukraine has been able to overcome their particular agendas and
forge intimate cooperation going beyond good neighbor
relations.89 Hence Poland looks west and south to cooperation
with EC, NATO, and its partners in the Vishegrad Four. If
Holovatyy accurately reflects Ukrainian policy, Poland would be
wrong in looking to Kiev for support against Russia. Indeed it
would then be exposed to tremendous pressures from Russia90
At the same time the belief in certain Western and Ukrainian
quarters that while Parliament was now right to ratify the START
I treaty, Ukraine should now withhold voting to join the NPT
until the financial compensation comes across and its ownership
of the weapons in question is legally recognized abroad, also
reflects a high degree of unrealism.91 To confirm Ukraine as a
nuclear state in advance of its joining the NPT and to pay it for
so doing does not only open the way for others to practice this
kind of nuclear blackmail. It also gives Ukraine a pretext for
breaking its word and not joining the NPT or giving up its
weapons over the next several years, especially if a crisis with

Russia should intervene. Since the Rada has accepted the START
treaty but not the NPT, such a situation could come about,
particularly since the vote on the NPT will be left to the new
Rada elected on March 27. In other words, delaying the vote on
the NPT which alone can effectuate the treaty, implicitly links
it to the Crimean issue and opens up myriad possibilities for
further blackmail and delay. Though proponents of such a course
want to see the financial benefits of the new treaty before they
definitively renounce a nuclear option, given the bureaucratic
procedures involved on all sides, and the unwillingness of both
Washington and Moscow to accept further Ukrainian equivocation,
that is unlikely. But if these politicians have their way, they
will further tarnish Ukraine's already dubious reputation abroad,
and prolong both its economic and ethnic crises without achieving
real security. Ukraine can no longer equivocate and indulge in
what is called "opaque" proliferation.92 The treaty forces it out
into the open as proliferator or nonproliferator.
All of this discussion suggests the complexities and
numerous difficulties of the issues of local, regional, and
European security that are involved in Ukraine's security agenda
and that could be linked to or affected by its ultimate
nuclearization or renunciation of that option. Obviously it is
clear to the United States and the West that Ukraine needs great
assistance over a long time to climb out of the depths to which
it has fallen. Only recently has it become apparent to the
Clinton administration that Russian policy declarations are
menacing to all its neighbors and ultimately to Eurasian
tranquility. Therefore Partnership for Peace is taking on a
decidedly more anti-Russian hue, or so we are told.93 But it
hardly suffices to call 1994 the year of Ukraine as 1993 was the
year of Russia. A much more serious engagement with both Ukraine
and Russia is needed.
Indeed, if one examines the policy and professional analyses
being published now it becomes clear that the task of engaging
Russia and the other successor states who are deeply offended by
our insistence on Russia first is one of monumental depth,
longevity, and investment of both time and resources in both the
private and public sectors.94 To date our performance, apart from
actual legislation, has been quite insufficient in both Russia
and Central Europe.95 The challenges facing us in Ukraine are no
less daunting, extensive, and protracted. But from the
examination here it also is clear that a truly viable and
coherent U.S. policy for Ukraine must also fully engage our
Russian policy and lead Washington into a truly comprehensive
engagement with the complex, unresolved, and multiple problems of
the other post- Communist states. Sadly there is only the
slightest hint or sign that we grasp the true magnitude of what
we have gotten into by virtue of this treaty with Kiev and
Moscow.
Yet at the same time it is difficult to see what Ukraine
itself will do with the money and recognition it has won. It is

unlikely the elections will bring about less polarization.
Ukraine is ethnically and territorially divided between Russians
in the East and South and nationalists in the North and West.
Institutionally Ukraine's politics are driven by the rivalry of
executive and legislative where Kravchuk steadily maneuvered to
concentrate power in his hands alone. But he has used that power
to reinstate a version of Soviet type economics not reform. And
no alternative is in sight, no matter what unnamed officials in
Washington claim about a renewed focus on economic reform in
Kiev.96 Absent real reform Ukraine's crises can only grow more
acute, perhaps even before the end of this spring. Nuclear
weapons and the treaties about them would then fast become prime
instruments for blackmail and threat in a conflict.
By negotiating, imposing, and signing this treaty we have
also indicated that we will not be content with playing a passive
role in Russo-Ukrainian affairs. But the imminent crisis, whose
solution can only involve a protracted social agony, ultimately
makes us to some degree hostage to subsequent developments in
Ukraine. While perhaps this is the unavoidable price of our
policy to achieve the desirable aim of denuclearizing Ukraine,
the American people or government probably do not fully
understand either how much or how long they may have to pay for
it. Although this treaty may have been the best of all available
U.S. policies, it could still turn out to have been too little
too late.
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